Sample Report — Website Security Deep Review (€499)
This is what a real security review looks like.
The report is written for owners, directors, and decision-makers — not just for technical teams. Clear, honest, with realistic risks and practical actions. No fear-based selling. Here's an excerpt from a real report.
1. Executive Summary
Example Company Ltd — example-company.com
Reviewed on 14 May 2026 · Written authorisation · Passive external analysis · Auditor: SAB Security, Karlsruhe
Overall impression: The website is fundamentally well set up. HTTPS, HSTS, and the most important security headers are correctly configured. No open admin panels, no database backups, and no sensitive configuration files were found. The most important action item is in the email area: DKIM is missing, and DMARC is set to monitoring only. Without DKIM, forged emails can be sent in the domain's name — a relevant risk for customer trust and fake invoices.
Conclusion: No critical security gaps. Two medium-severity items with real business risk (missing DKIM, GDPR process gap in the contact form). All technical recommendations can be implemented with minimal effort. A short retest after remediation is included in the Deep Review package.
2. Scope & Authorisation
What was reviewed
- DNS: A, AAAA, MX, TXT, SPF, DKIM, DMARC
- HTTP→HTTPS redirect and www/non-www behaviour
- TLS certificate and encryption
- Security headers (HSTS, CSP, X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options, Referrer-Policy, Permissions-Policy)
- Publicly accessible files (.env, .git, backups, robots.txt, sitemap.xml, security.txt)
- CMS / admin panel discovery
- Contact form: validation, consent, honeypot, basic XSS, rate limiting
What was deliberately not reviewed
- No brute-force attacks
- No denial-of-service tests
- No social engineering
- No destructive testing
- No access to protected systems or data
- No credential sharing
This review was conducted with the client's written authorisation. All tests were passive, non-destructive, and limited to publicly available information.
3. Methodology
The review follows a standardised, reproducible process — comparable to an attacker's first look at the public website, but controlled, documented, and without harmful actions.
All tests are conducted from Karlsruhe, Germany. Each check step is logged with date, time, and result. Tools used: DNS queries (dig), HTTP header analysis (curl), TLS verification (openssl), and manual review of identified entries.
The report uses a realistic, business-oriented rating:
Medium — Real business risk (misuse, compliance, customer trust)
Low — Hardening, additional safeguards, minor improvements
Info — Observation, no immediate action required
Findings that are only theoretical or have no demonstrable business impact are not included. No "critical" without a proven exploit path.
4. Detailed Findings
DKIM missing — email spoofing possible
MediumResult: No DKIM records were found for the domain. Checked selectors: default, google, selector1, selector2, mail, k1, cloudflare, cf.
No record found.
Recommendation: Configure DKIM signing with your email provider (Google Workspace, Microsoft 365, Cloudflare Email Routing, etc.). The provider supplies the public key to publish as a DNS TXT record. Effort: about 15 minutes. Afterwards, raise SPF to -all and DMARC to p=quarantine.
DMARC set to p=none — no enforcement
LowResult: DMARC is present but set to p=none (monitoring only).
Recommendation: After configuring DKIM, evaluate DMARC reports for 2–4 weeks. If no legitimate emails fail, raise to p=quarantine (pct=25 for 2 weeks, then pct=100).
Privacy consent not enforced server-side on contact form
MediumResult: The contact form only checks the privacy consent checkbox in the browser (client-side). A direct POST request without privacy_consent is accepted by the server.
{"ok":true} — request was stored without consent.
Recommendation: Add a server-side check: reject requests where privacy_consent !== true with HTTP 400. Effort: about 5 minutes.
CSP allows 'unsafe-inline' and 'unsafe-eval'
LowResult: The Content Security Policy includes 'unsafe-inline' and 'unsafe-eval' in script-src.
Recommendation: Medium-term: migrate inline scripts to external .js files (with nonce or hash). As long as the site renders no dynamic user content, the current setup is acceptable.
PGP key referenced in security.txt not reachable
LowResult: The security.txt references a PGP key at /.well-known/pgp-key.txt, which returns HTTP 403 (Forbidden).
Recommendation: Either serve the PGP key (adjust nginx rule) or remove the reference from security.txt. Effort: 2 minutes.
5. Confirmed Security Measures
| Check Area | Result | |
|---|---|---|
| HTTPS & TLS | TLS 1.3, valid Let's Encrypt certificate | Secure |
| HTTP→HTTPS Redirect | 301 redirect working correctly | Secure |
| HSTS (HTTP Strict Transport Security) | max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains; preload | Secure |
| X-Frame-Options / X-Content-Type-Options | SAMEORIGIN / nosniff — correctly set | Secure |
| Referrer-Policy / Permissions-Policy | Restrictive and sensibly configured | Secure |
| Sensitive files | .env, .git/* blocked with 403 | Secure |
| No admin panels | No /wp-admin, no /admin, no CMS backend exposed | Secure |
| robots.txt / sitemap.xml / security.txt | All three present and correct | Present |
6. Retest (included in the Deep Review package)
The Website Security Deep Review (€499) includes exactly one short retest after you have implemented the recommended measures.
| Finding | Status |
|---|---|
| DKIM missing | Open |
| DMARC p=none | Open |
| Privacy consent server-side | Open |
| CSP unsafe-inline | Accepted Risk |
| PGP key not reachable | Open |
Fixed — set to this status after successful retest.
Accepted Risk — deliberately not addressed, documented.
Open — not yet handled.
7. Recommended Next Steps
| Priority | Action | Effort |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Set up DKIM with your email provider | ~15 min. |
| 2 | Add server-side privacy consent check | ~5 min. |
| 3 | Raise DMARC to p=quarantine after DKIM | ~5 min. |
| 4 | Serve PGP key or remove reference | ~2 min. |
| 5 | Migrate inline scripts to external files (long-term) | ~1 hr. |
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